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According to economic statecraft theory, states use investments 
by state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) to achieve geopolitical 
objectives, such as securing control over resources or exercising 
influence in zones of special strategic interest.  There is increasing 
interest about the geopolitics of foreign investments under the 
Chinese and Russian infrastructure diplomacy.  Geopolitical 
investments pose a challenge to investment arbitration–a 
mechanism created to depoliticize the resolution of investor-state 
disputes.  This article argues that, in the context of growing 
economic power of SOEs and increasing geopolitical tensions, 
geopolitics cannot and should not be excluded from the investment 
arbitration process.  At the jurisdictional stage, it makes sense to 
focus on the commercial nature of investments in strategic sectors, 
given the difficulty of establishing the real motivation of foreign 
investors on the basis of objective criteria.  However, on the merits, 
geopolitical arguments are often the only basis on which host states 
can substantiate their security concerns regarding foreign control 
over strategic assets.  Excluding geopolitical analysis from 
investment arbitration would negatively affect host states’ defense 
of regulatory interference with strategic investments. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this article is to propose a new interdisciplinary 
perspective to the study of investment arbitration based on the 
theories of “economic statecraft” (i.e., the study of economic 
activities as instruments of foreign policy)1 and “geopolitics” (i.e., 
the study of interstate competition for territory, resources, and 
security).2  As highlighted by opposition to certain Chinese 
investments in OECD countries, host states perceive the economic 
power of SOEs from emerging economies as a potential risk to their 
own national security.3  This concern finds support in a growing 
body of literature on economic statecraft, according to which certain 
states use SOEs to achieve geopolitical objectives.4  Foreign 
investments by SOEs can be made to secure control over resources, 
obtain political concessions, or exercise influence in zones of special 
interest.5  To protect national security, host states can block the 
                                                             
 1 See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 9 (1985) (stating that to study 
statecraft is to consider the instruments used by policy makers in their attempts to 
exercise power). 
 2 See, e.g., COLIN FLINT, INTRODUCTION TO GEOPOLITICS 38–47 (2d ed. 2012); 
JAKUB GRYGIEL, GREAT POWERS AND GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE 39 (2006) (discussing 
how some states can increase power by controlling resources). 
 3 See James Kynge et al., Western Resistance to China Blocks $40bn of Acquisitions, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), at 1 (stating that since mid-2015, “Western” countries 
blocked approximately $40 billion dollars of Chinese acquisitions, mainly in 
response to security concerns). 
 4 See, e.g., TOM MILLER, CHINA’S ASIAN DREAM: EMPIRE BUILDING ALONG THE 
NEW SILK ROAD 13 (2017) (examining China’s use of SOEs to expand its geopolitical 
influence); ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & JENNIFER M. HARRIS, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: 
GEOECONOMIC AND STATECRAFT 1–18, 20 (2016) (observing that some “states are 
currently applying economic instruments to advance geopolitical ends”).  See also 
BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 42–43 (providing examples of economic statecraft); 
NICHOLAS J. SPYKMAN, AMERICA’S STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS: THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE BALANCE OF POWER, 12 (1970) (citing persuasion, purchase, barter, and 
coercion as four main methods to win friends and influence people).  See generally 
WILLIAM J. NORRIS, CHINESE ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: COMMERCIAL ACTORS, GRAND 
STRATEGY, AND STATE CONTROL (2016). 
 5 See, e.g., BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, at 53–58 (observing that a large 
number of state-led investments are geopolitically motivated, and that even those 
which are not can have geopolitical consequences); NORRIS, supra note 4, at 82 
(referring to the use of oil reserves as an example in which the state relies on finance 
to secure strategic resources); GERRY KEARNS, GEOPOLITICS AND EMPIRE: THE LEGACY 
OF HALFORD MACKINDER 268 (2009) (describing how SOEs are used for imperialism); 
Aad Correljé & Coby van der Linde, Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
386 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:2 
acquisition of strategic assets by SOEs from states perceived as 
unfriendly.  They can also re-regulate existing investments in the 
case of deterioration of bilateral relations with the home state of the 
SOE (e.g., forced disinvestment or renegotiation of the investment 
agreement).6  The economic statecraft and geopolitical theories help 
host states to understand the security risks of investments by SOEs, 
and help SOEs to anticipate the risk of state interference. 
The special nature of SOEs and the security risks they pose to 
host states are also examined in investment law literature, with a 
focus on governance principles, national security reviews, and the 
access of SOEs to investment arbitration.  It is a principle of 
international economic governance that state-owned investment 
vehicles should aim to maximize financial returns and operate on 
the basis of sound asset management principles.7  In the absence of 
liberalization commitments, governments can, at the pre-
establishment stage, exercise broad discretion and exclude 
investments which are perceived to be motivated by unfriendly 
intentions.8  At the post-establishment stage, state anxieties 
regarding the perceived security risks of SOEs can result in 
discriminatory action, which the SOEs can challenge through 
                                                             
European Perspective, 34 ENERGY POLICY 532, 536 (2006) (noting the impact of SOEs 
on the security of energy supply to the EU). 
 6 See, e.g., Rodolphe Desbordes & Vincent Vicard, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: An International Political Perspective, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 
372, 373 (2009) (“foreign firms may suffer from the retaliatory consequences of 
deteriorating diplomatic relations between their home and host countries”); 
UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs, ON THE UNCTAD 1, at 30–32 
(2009), http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20085_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5JM-
4FS6] (noting that host countries can impose emergency measures or force 
disinvestment if foreign investment poses a threat to national security). 
 7 See generally INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, 
Sovereign Wealth Fund: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) “Santiago 
Principles” (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K3FQ-4TAG]; OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
of State-Owned Enterprises 49 (2015 ed.), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264244160-
en [https://perma.cc/LX9A-XYZY]; Ines Willemyns, Disciplines on State-Owned 
Enterprises in International Economic Law: Are We Moving in the Right Direction?, 19 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 657 (2016). 
 8 See generally Julien Chaisse, Demystifying Public Security Exception and 
Limitations on Capital Movement: Hard Law, Soft Law and Sovereign Investments in the 
EU Internal Market, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L  L. 583 (2015). 
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investment arbitration.9  Given the close link between SOEs and 
their home state governments, the access of SOEs to arbitration 
challenges the core objective of investor-state dispute resolution, to 
insulate investors’ claims “from political and diplomatic relations 
between states”10 and remove the home state from the arbitration 
process.11 
Despite their common object of study, the investment law and 
economic statecraft literatures have remained largely disconnected 
from each other.  On the one hand, investment law analyses 
recognize that SOEs can pose a challenge to national security,12 
without examining the geopolitical roots of this security problem.  
On the other hand, geopolitical studies only rarely engage with the 
legal dimension of strategic investments13 and pay little attention to 
the possible protection of SOEs under investment arbitration.  In the 
gap between these two disciplines, an essential dimension to the 
understanding of investment arbitration is lost. 
                                                             
 9 See Paul Blyshak, State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: 
When Are State-Owned Entities and their Investments Protection, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L 
REL. 1, 14 (2011) (noting that SOEs may be subject to discriminatory or arbitrary 
treatment and emphasizing on the importance to determine the standing of SOEs 
to bring investment arbitration claims); UNCTAD, supra note 6, at 30–32 (reminding 
that national security considerations can affect investments). 
 10 Separate Opinion of Andreas Lowenfeld, in Corn Products International, 
Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, concur in Parts I–VII 
of the Awards, ¶ 1 (2008).  See also Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, RECUEIL DES COURS 
331 (1972) (noting impacts of SOEs on states). 
 11 See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic 
Disputes and Legal Fictions, 31 ICSID REV. 12 (2016) (highlighting foreign investments 
made by states and their effects on investment treaty arbitrations).  See also Martins 
Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, 
in SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (James 
Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2010) (describing different dimensions of and 
limits to the “depoliticization” objective of investment arbitration depending on 
whether the perspective of the home state, the host state, or the investor is taken). 
 12 See, e.g., James E. Mendenhall, Assessing Security Risks Posed by State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Context of International Investment Agreements, 31 ICSID REV. 36 
(2016) (analyzing the extent to which investments by SOEs present national security 
risks to the host state). 
 13 But see Andreas Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2: Regulation, Geopolitics 
and Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe and the UK, European Centre for 
Energy and Resource Security Strategy Paper, 19 (2016), 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/eucers
/pubs/strategy-paper-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF4J-5J2Z] (analyzing the 
geopolitical, regulatory, and energy security aspects as in the context of Nord 
Stream 2). 
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The main argument of this article is that, in a context of the 
growing influence of SOEs and the strategic use of foreign 
investments by certain states, geopolitical analysis plays a role in the 
resolution of disputes concerning strategic investments.  In the 
analysis on jurisdiction, the relevance of geopolitical arguments is 
limited.  Arbitral tribunals can be reluctant to refuse jurisdiction on 
the basis of the perceived geopolitical motivation of a SOE, thus 
opening the door to the arbitration of geopolitical and state-to-state 
disputes.  The home state government, through its control of the 
SOE, can indirectly be involved in an investor-state dispute 
resolution concerning geopolitical issues.  However, in an analysis 
on the merits, geopolitical arguments are often the only basis 
through which a host state can justify regulatory interference with a 
strategic investment by a SOE in the context of tensions between its 
home state and the host state.  The economic statecraft and 
geopolitical theories provide a rational framework to assess the 
reasonableness of security measures and can thus contribute to 
disciplining arbitrary measures under investment arbitration, e.g., 
the politically motivated retaliation against a SOE in the context of 
interstate tensions. 
The structure of the argument proceeds as follows.  Section II 
starts with an introduction to the economic statecraft and 
geopolitical theories, and, in particular, to the role of foreign 
investment by SOEs as instrument of geopolitics.  On this basis, 
section III (on jurisdiction) examines the question of access of 
geopolitical investors to arbitration.  Building on the existing 
literature on the access of SOEs to arbitration, the analysis focuses 
on the extent to which state control and the possible geopolitical 
motivation of investments prevent investor-state dispute settlement.  
Section IV (on merits) studies the relevance of geopolitical 
arguments for the application of substantive standards of 
investment protection to the regulation of the perceived security 
risks of existing investments (post-establishment).  Security reviews 
to control the access of foreign investors to strategic industries (pre-
establishment) are not the focus of this article. 
2.  A GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The relevance of geopolitical analysis for investment law 
depends on a clear delimitation of the notion of “economic 
statecraft,” “geopolitical investment,” and “geopolitical risk.”  From 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/2
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the state’s perspective, it is essential to define these notions to help 
the government understand and address the security risks that the 
country faces.  From the investor’s perspective, a clear delimitation 
of the notion of “geopolitical risk” is important to restrict the scope 
of government interference with its investments.  Indeed, the 
concept of geopolitics is a “powerful rhetorical tool” that can 
“mobilise materialist or militarist visions of international security.”14  
For instance, references to the use of “energy as a foreign political 
weapon” and “gas wars” are common in the analysis of foreign 
investment and trade in the strategic energy sector.15 
2.1.  Economic Statecraft and Geopolitical Investments 
Economic statecraft refers to the use—or abuse (i.e., 
manipulation)—by states of economic instruments (e.g., 
investments) as an alternative to military power and classical 
diplomacy to achieve geopolitical results.16  “Infrastructure 
diplomacy” replaces or complements “gunboat diplomacy” as an 
instrument of geopolitical influence.17 
Although the notion of geopolitics is the subject of controversy,18 
the literature generally agrees that, within its broad meaning, 
                                                             
 14 STEFANO GUZZINI, THE RETURN OF GEOPOLITICS IN EUROPE? SOCIAL 
MECHANISMS AND FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY CRISES 40–43 (Stefano Guzzini ed., 2013). 
 15 See Martin Walker, Russia v. Europe: The Energy Wars, 24 WORLD POL’Y J. 1 
(2007) (describing Russia’s use of its oil wealth as a geopolitical asset to subdue 
former Soviet states). 
 16 See NORRIS, supra note 4, at 3 (“Economic statecraft can be broadly 
understood as state manipulation of international economic activities for strategic 
purposes.”); BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 9 (describing statecraft as instruments used 
by policy makers to push others to do what they would not otherwise do); 
BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that economic instruments are used 
to produce beneficial geopolitical results); Mikael Mattlin & Mikael Wigell, Geo-
economics in the Context of Restive Regional Powers, 14 ASIA EUR. J. 125 (2016) 
(analyzing how major regional powers leverage economic power in international 
relations). 
 17 MILLER, supra note 4, at 13. 
 18 See, e.g., Øyvind Østerud, The Uses and Abuses of Geopolitics, 25 J. PEACE RES. 
191 (1988) (describing variations in the use of term geopolitics within the study of 
international relations); Christopher Fettweis, Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The 
Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics, 22 COMP. STRATEGY 109 (2003) (arguing that 
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geopolitics concerns the interaction between geographical attributes 
(spatial location, size, topography, borders, climate, and distribution 
of resources) and international political power.19  The “geopolitical 
reality” is defined by “the geographic distribution of centers of 
resources and lines of communication, assigning value to locations 
according to their strategic importance.”20  Geopolitical analysis 
helps us to understand the practice of states competing for territory 
and resources, and defending their national security.21  The strategic 
importance of certain resources and locations for national security 
drives states to develop foreign policies to achieve control over these 
resources and protect their strategic interests in these locations. 
Geopolitics, within the progressive meaning of the term, covers 
the use of soft power instruments, including foreign investments by 
SOEs in sectors of strategic importance.  SOEs can act as 
“geopolitical investors” by making investments that pursue 
strategic interests.22 
In the energy sector, for instance, foreign investments by SOEs 
can aim to achieve the strategic objectives of energy security and 
increased influence in zones of special strategic interest.23  First, by 
investing in energy-producing states and developing cross-border 
pipeline infrastructures, SOEs from energy-importing states (e.g., 
China’s CNPC) contribute to the availability of external energy 
                                                             
while the term geopolitics classically referred to territorial conquests, the term has 
evolved in modern times and is now broader in scope). 
 19 See SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 16 (3d ed. 2015) (recognizing the importance of geography’s role in 
modern geopolitics and international affairs); GEOFFREY PARKER, GEOPOLITICS: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 5 (1998) (defining geopolitics as the study of international 
relations from a spatial or geographic perspective). 
 20 GRYGIEL, supra note 2, at 22. 
 21 SEE FLINT, supra note 2, at 31 (providing sources that reflect the scope of the 
geopolitical framework); GRYGIEL, supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that states have 
various motivations to control borders and economic resources). 
 22 See, e.g., BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, 53–58 (noting an impact on 
international relations when SOEs invest in foreign countries); KEARNS supra note 
5, at 268 (discussing transnational corporations and their effects on the labor laws 
of the foreign countries where they invest); Correljé & van der Linde, supra note 5, 
at 536 (arguing that regional powers create spheres of influence through bilateral 
trade relationships in energy). 
 23 See ANDREAS GOLDTHAU & NICK SITTER, A LIBERAL ACTOR IN A REALIST WORLD 
4 (2015) (discussing the changing dynamics of post-Cold War energy policies and 
their effect on international affairs). 
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sources for the home state.24  The mandate by the state to secure 
external energy supplies explains decisions to invest in high-risk 
markets where commercially-driven companies can be reluctant to 
operate (e.g., Central Asia).25  Second, SOEs from energy-exporting 
countries (e.g., Russia’s Gazprom) engage in the development of 
infrastructure in order to secure the future demand for their energy 
products, and thereby to protect the financial viability of their 
investments in new oil and gas fields.26  These projects (e.g., the 
Nord Stream pipeline linking Russia to the EU by bypassing 
Ukraine) are often criticized for locking the importing countries into 
a relationship of energy dependence.27  Third, states can use foreign 
energy investments to exercise broader geopolitical influence.  
Similarly to the subsidization of energy supply in exchange for 
geostrategic allegiance,28 analysts explain Russian investments in 
the downstream energy infrastructure of post-Soviet countries (e.g., 
                                                             
 24 See, e.g., THRASSY MARKETOS, CHINA’S ENERGY GEOPOLITICS: THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND CENTRAL ASIA 20 (2009) (describing China’s 
decision to invest in the port of Gwadar in Pakistan in order to secure an alternative 
route to transport oil); Xiaolei Sun, et al., China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments 
in Overseas Energy: The Energy Security Perspective, 65 ENERGY POL. 1, 654–61 (2014) 
(describing China’s use of its sovereign wealth fund to invest in foreign energy 
projects); Bo Kong & Kevin Gallagher, The Globalization of Chinese Energy Companies: 
The Role of State Finance, ON BOSTON ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE 11–13 (2016), 
http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2016/06/Globalization.Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FW2Q-CZAT] (outlining Chinese government control over 
Chinese energy companies). 
 25 See, e.g., HINRICH VOSS, THE DETERMINANTS OF CHINESE OUTWARD DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 133 (2011) (hypothesizing that Chinese government policies account 
for a positive correlation between countries with higher risk and Chinese foreign 
investment in those countries). 
 26 See Tatiana Mitrova, The Geopolitics of Russian Natural Gas, HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY BELFER CENTER & BAKER INSTITUTE CENTER FOR ENERGY STUDIES, at 15 
(2014), 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/research_document/cdfea656/CES-
pub-GeoGasRussiax-022114.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EUS-9GEX] (describing 
Russia’s use of its gas resources to exercise influence over former Soviet states). 
 27 See, e.g., Jekterina Grigorjeva & Marco Siddi, Nord Stream 2: Opportunities 
and Dilemmas of a New Gas Supply Route for the EU, JACQUES DELORS INSTITUTE (2016), 
http://www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/20160510_Nord-Stream-2_Grigorjeva_Siddi-
ONLIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF5N-N7KX] (arguing that the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline makes Europe more dependent on Russian gas). 
 28 See Stacy Closson, A Comparative Analysis on Energy Subsidies in Soviet and 
Russian Policy, 44 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 343 (2011) (describing 
Russia’s use of hydrocarbon subsidies to influence former Soviet states). 
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power plants in Central Asia) are based on Russia’s geopolitical 
interest in retaining these countries within its sphere of influence.29  
Furthermore, analysts explain Chinese investments in the 
downstream energy infrastructure of its neighbors based on China’s 
strategic interest to maintain political stability in its “strategic 
rear.”30  China’s participation in facilitating the energy security of its 
strategic partners is an important part of  China’s “good 
neighborhood” policy and, more recently, its “Belt and Road” (New 
Silk Road) initiative.31 
Although analysts generally agree that geopolitical objectives 
(energy security and strategic influence) are an important rationale 
of foreign investments by Russian SOEs, analysts disagree on 
whether geopolitics constitute the only or dominant driver of these 
investments.  Some consider Gazprom’s investments in the EU 
energy market as being driven by “fairly conventional profit 
                                                             
 29 See, e.g., ALEXANDER COOLEY, GREAT GAMES, LOCAL RULES: THE NEW GREAT 
POWER CONTEST ON CENTRAL ASIA 67, 116–33 (2012); Natal’ia Skorolygina, 
Rosneftegaz zaplatit za Kirgiziiu, KOMMERSANT (Mar. 14, 2014), 
www.kommersant.ru/doc/2428684 [https://perma.cc/M4KG-BNK2] (detailing 
Russian government financing of a major Kyrgyz power plant); International Crisis 
Group, Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses 5–6, 
https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/18752 [https://perma.cc/E5AA-D4FS] 
(arguing that Russian government’s financial aid given to Kyrgyzstan for its energy 
crisis in 2009 was conditioned on Kyrgyz closure of U.S. airbase); LENA JONSON, 
TAJIKISTAN IN THE NEW CENTRAL ASIA: GEOPOLITICS GREAT POWER RIVALRY AND 
RADICAL ISLAM 77–78 (2006) (describing the competition between Russia and Iran to 
invest in Tajikistan’s energy infrastructure). 
 30 On China’s “strategic rear,” see, e.g., Zhao Huasheng, Central Asia in Chinese 
Strategic Thinking, in THE NEW GREAT GAME: CHINA AND SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 
IN THE ERA OF REFORM 171, 177–85 (Thomas Fingar ed., 2016) (describing Chinese 
government efforts to secure gas supplies from Central Asia, which is described as 
territory within Russia’s zone of influence); Thomas Fingar, China and South and 
Central Asia in the Era of Reform and Opening, in THE NEW GREAT GAME: CHINA AND 
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA IN THE ERA OF REFORM 13 (Thomas Fingar ed., 2016) 
(arguing that when deciding to engage with other countries, the Chinese 
government rely on the effect that the engagement would have on its security and 
internal stability).  See generally MARLÈNE LARUELLE & SEBASTIEN PEYROUSE, THE 
CHINESE QUESTION ON CENTRAL ASIA: DOMESTIC ORDER, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE 
CHINESE FACTOR (2012). 
 31 CHIEN-PEN CHUNG, CHINA’S MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC: INSTITUTIONALISING BEIJING’S “GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICY” (2010) (describing 
China’s policy of creating good network relations with its neighboring countries); 
MILLER, supra note 4, at 21–43 (examining China’s use of SOEs for its “Belt and 
Road” initiative). 
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motives, albeit under conditions of geopolitical uncertainty.”32  
Others argue that Russian SOEs “serve the purposes of Russia’s 
foreign policy rather than commercial logic.”33  The Nord Stream 2 
project, for instance, is “not a commercial project only; it has huge 
political implications.”34  Similarly, the rationale for outbound 
investments by Chinese SOEs is often defined based on a mix of 
geopolitical and commercial interests.35  According to Fitch Rating’s 
2017 report on China’s “Belt and Road” (OBOR) initiative, “genuine 
infrastructure needs and commercial logic might be secondary to 
political motivations.  OBOR . . . is a component of China’s efforts to 
                                                             
 32 Rawi Abdelal, The Profits of Power: Commerce and Realpolitik in Eurasia, 20 
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 421, 438 (2013); see also Sanja Tepavcevic, The Motives of 
Russian State-Owned Companies for Outward Foreign Direct Investment and its Impact 
on State-Company Cooperation, 23 TRANSNAT’L CORP. 29, 53 (2015), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/diaeia2015d1a2_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P8LT-U8TF] (arguing that profits and business interests are the 
primary motivation of Russian SOE investments in foreign countries). 
 33 Peeter Vahtra, Expansion or Exodus? Russian TNCs Amidst the Global Economic 
Crisis, PAN-EUROPEAN INSTITUTE 7 (2009), 
https://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-
tietopaketit/Documents/Vahtra_Russian%20TNCs%20global%20economic%20cri
si_2009%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7U6-KLAB]; see also Kari Liuhto, Genesis of 
Economic Nationalism in Russia, PAN-EUROPEAN INSTITUTE (2008), 
https://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-
tietopaketit/Documents/Liuhto_32008.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q53J-M4MH] 
(arguing that Russian government control over companies that extract natural 
resources is part of a broader nationalist economic strategy); Nina Poussenkova, 
The Global Expansion of Russia’s Energy Giants, 63 COLUM. J. INT’L AFF. 103 (2010) 
(describing close ties between various Russian state-owned energy companies and 
the Russian government). 
 34 Ewa Krukowska, Russian Gas Link Extension May Face EU Law Compliance 
Risk, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
02-04/russian-nord-stream-2-gas-link-may-face-eu-law-compliance-risk 
[https://perma.cc/H4HT-JMQS]. 
 35 See Mathieu Duchâtel, et al., Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow 
Shift Away from Non-Interference, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INSTIT. POL’Y 
PAPER 41, 34 (June 2014), 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP41.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JS85-AD7P] (examining how China will use political influence 
and military power internationally in support of its national interests); see also Julie 
Jiang & Jonathan Sinton, Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: 
Assessing the Drivers and Impacts, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 12, 17 (2011), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/overseas_china
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKL2-HRXL] (arguing that commercial motives and 
securing supply to meet domestic energy demands drives state-owned investments 
abroad). 
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expand its strategic international influence.”36  Geopolitical 
investments in the energy sector are thus often “hybrid”37 or 
“chameleon”38 investments. 
2.2.  Geopolitical Risk, Security Externalities, and Regulatory Changes 
With the exception of climate change and boundary adjustments 
following drastic political changes, geographical attributes are 
mostly constant.  However, geopolitics are dynamic.39  Geopolitical 
reality changes with the rise and decline of resources, routes, and 
locations.  Technological, economic, and political developments 
alter the strategic importance of locations, and this can trigger the 
re-orientation of a state’s foreign policies towards these locations.  
To an important extent, the re-orientation of a state’s external 
strategy depends on the frame of reference (or “geopolitical code”) 
that governs the government’s interpretation of geopolitical 
developments.40  Changes to geopolitical reality are relatively slow 
and irrevocable, but decisions of strategic re-orientation based on 
the national authorities’ interpretation of geopolitical reality can be 
sudden.  The dynamic nature of geopolitics constitutes both a 
security risk for host states and a regulatory risk for investors. 
From the host state’s perspective, the deterioration or re-
orientation of the bilateral relationship with the home state of the 
SOE can create new security risks in cases where strategic assets are 
                                                             
 36 FitchRatings, China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative Brings Risks (Jan. 25, 2017), 
www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1018144 [https://perma.cc/FC5D-JQJ3]. 
 37 Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State,  Speech at the Economic Club of New York: 
Economic Statecraft (Oct. 14, 2011), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175552.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E88V-VNGE]. 
 38 Larry Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The 
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global 
Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425 (2010). 
 39 See Nicholas Spykman, Geography and Foreign Policy, I, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
28, 43 (1938) (describing how every country’s perception of international relations 
changes with its geographical location). 
 40 Id.  See also FLINT, supra note 2, at 43 (listing changes in economic strength 
and military costs as a challenge to world leadership). 
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concerned.41  Following shifts in strategic alliances, the host state can 
perceive42 investments by the SOE from a previously allied state as 
a new “security externality” that requires regulatory intervention.43 
For foreign investors in strategic assets, the host state’s 
perception of changes to the geopolitical context and the perceived 
necessity to mitigate the security risks resulting from the 
deterioration of interstate relations are significant regulatory risks.  
In more extreme cases, the host state can be tempted to retaliate 
against foreign investments by SOEs to punish the home state in the 
context of interstate tensions.  The EU-Russian energy relationship 
illustrates how foreign investments in strategic assets can be affected 
by (allegedly politically motivated) regulatory intervention taken in 
the context of deteriorating bilateral relations between the home and 
host states. 
For decades, the EU’s dependence on Russian energy was not 
considered a direct threat to EU energy security.44  The EU’s energy 
policy has long sought to achieve the “mutual long term benefits” of 
EU-Russian energy interdependence by intensifying commercial 
and political cooperation.45  Import dependence was not to be 
                                                             
 41 See UNCTAD, supra note 6, at 17  (arguing that national security concerns 
can be particularly strong in relation to foreign investors from states with which the 
host state has unfriendly relations); Desbordes & Vicard, supra note 6, at 373 
(arguing that multinational enterprises may face certain risks arising due to 
political relations between the home and host state). 
 42 See STEPHEN WALT, THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES (1987) (arguing that a state’s 
perception of threat is more important than pure power in determining threats and 
alliance behavior); see also ANDREW KYDD, TRUST AND MISTRUST IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (2005) (noting variables affecting states’ trust, including SOEs); Srikanth 
Kondapalli, Perception and Strategic Reality in India-China Relations, in HUASHENG, 
supra note 30, at 93, 96 (describing relations between India and China as “marked 
by suspicion, ambivalence, and hedging”). 
 43 See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 4, at 12–13 (using economic theory of 
externalities to describe the relationship between economics and national security); 
Abdelal, supra note 32, at 426 (noting that the interests of energy oligopolies can 
conflict with the security concerns of the state). 
 44 For a historical account, see, e.g., ANDREI V. BELYI, TRANSNATIONAL GAS 
MARKETS AND EURO-RUSSIAN ENERGY RELATIONS (Timothy M. Shaw ed., 2015) 
(examining EU-Russia energy interdependence and its impact on Euro-Russian 
relations over time); PER HÖGSELIUS, RED GAS: RUSSIA AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN 
ENERGY DEPENDENCE (Akira Iriye & Rana Mitter eds., 2013) (analyzing the evolution 
of the Soviet natural gas infrastructure and its interconnection with European 
energy markets). 
 45 See Communication from the Commission to the European Council: External 
Energy Relations - From Principles to Action, COM (2006) 590 final (Oct. 12, 2006), 
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reduced, but managed.46  Russian energy companies invested in the 
EU energy market and EU companies invested in Russia.  However, 
successive Russia-Ukraine crises negatively affected the EU’s 
perception of Russian energy and seriously damaged the EU-
Russian energy relationship.47  According to the 2014 European 
Energy Security Strategy, “the most pressing energy security of 
supply issue is the strong dependence from a single external 
supplier,” which, in the EU’s case, is Russia.48 
The deterioration of the EU-Russian energy relationship and the 
perception of risk regarding the EU’s external energy dependence 
triggered the EU’s adoption of regulatory measures directed at 
addressing this concern.  Most notably, in 2009, the EU introduced 
an energy security review mechanism—the “Gazprom clause”—to 
evaluate the risk that non-EU investors pose to the security of the 
EU energy sector.49  A key element in this energy security 
assessment is the level of energy dependence between the EU and 
the home country of the applicant50—a criterion that de facto targets 
Russian energy investors by taking into account EU dependence on 
                                                             
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2006/EN/1-2006-590-EN-F1-
1.Pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZHG-VRCM] (discussing engagement with EU 
neighbors to achieve greater energy cooperation across the region). 
 46 See, e.g., Commission Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security 
of Energy Supply, at 15, COM (2000) 769 final (2000) (assessing the EU’s long-term 
strategic interests and the methods by which to achieve these goals). 
 47 See Council of the European Union Press Release, Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy Council Meeting, Council Conclusions on “Energy 
Prices and Costs, Protection of Vulnerable Consumers and Competitiveness,” COUNCIL 
MEETING (June 13, 2014), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/
143198.pdf [https://perma.cc/69PW-UZ76] (reviewing the EUs internal and 
external energy markets and the impact of those markets on consumers). 
 48 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 
European Energy Security Strategy, at 1, COM (2014) 330 final (May 28, 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/European_Energy_Se
curity_Strategy_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9QH-PH8V]. 
 49 See Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and 
Repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, art 11, 2009 O.J. (L211) 94, 95 (requiring Member 
States to implement security reviews of foreign investments in the electricity and 
natural gas transmission infrastructure). 
 50 Id. at recital 22 (examining EU energy dependence on States outside the EU 
and highlighting the importance of securing the supply of energy within EU 
Member States). 
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Russian imports.51  In addition to the Gazprom clause, EU member 
states have implemented measures for ownership unbundling of 
energy activities (i.e., separation of control over network and supply 
assets).  These measures directly interfered with the business model 
of Gazprom in the EU.  In reaction, Gazprom, a Russian company, 
initiated investment arbitration proceedings to contest the 
implementation of these measures in Lithuania.52  Russia also 
regularly accuses the EU Commission of engaging in “politically 
motivated interpretations of EU regulation”53 aimed at 
“expropriat[ing] Gazprom’s assets” in the EU.54 
Similarly, policy analysts note a risk to Chinese energy 
investments stemming from political and regulatory intervention by 
host States who perceive China’s increasing influence in the host 
State as a threat.55  Recent riots in Kazakhstan against Chinese 
investments highlight China’s susceptibility to the risk of “resource 
nationalism,” namely, the risk of Kazakhstan nationalizing Chinese 
investments to address public anger about a  perceived “takeover” 
                                                             
 51 See Thomas Cottier, et al., Third Country Relations in EU Unbundling of 
Natural Gas Markets: The “Gazprom Clause” of Directive 2009/73 EC and WTO Law 
(WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE, NCCR TRADE REGULATION, UNIVERSITY OF BERN, 
SWITZERLAND, WORKING PAPER NO. 2010/06, http://www.nccr-
trade.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-
trade.ch/wp5/Access%20to%20gasgrids.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2C2-EDJ8] 
(assessing the Gazprom clause under WTO law). 
 52 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, OAO Gazprom (Russian Federation) v. 
The Republic of Lithuania, (2013) (case interrupted), in PERMANENT COURT OF 
ARBITRATION ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2014), https://perma.cc/A3Z8-2S47 (reporting 
Gazprom’s claim arising out of the alleged forced divestiture of its investment in 
gas distribution in Lithuania). 
 53 Goldthau, supra note 13, at 22. 
 54 Goldthau, supra note 13, at 19.  See also Marek Martyniszyn, The EU’s Case 
Against Gazprom Is About Far More than Business, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://theconversation.com/the-eus-case-against-gazprom-is-about-far-more-
than-business-40773 [https://perma.cc/KDM3-7HJP] (analyzing EU-Russia 
relations through a Gazprom lens); Jonathan Stern et al., Does the Cancellation of 
South Stream Signal a Fundamental Reorientation of Russian Gas Export Policy?, THE 
OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Does-
cancellation-of-South-Stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-Russian-gas-
export-policy-GPC-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2GT-XQ5L] (discussing the 
Gazprom-EU discourse regarding the South Stream infrastructure project). 
 55 See Duchâtel, et al., supra note 35, at 25–26 (examining China’s foreign policy 
shift from non-interference to pragmatic intervention). 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
398 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:2 
of national resources by China.56  As highlighted by the China 
Heilongjiang International v. Mongolia arbitration case, public 
opposition to increasing dependence on China can result in the 
sudden cancellation of licenses previously granted to Chinese 
companies for the exploration and exploitation of national 
resources.57 
In this strategic context, can state-owned investors in projects of 
geopolitical importance challenge state interference with their 
investments through international arbitration mechanisms? 
3.  JURISDICTION:  ACCESS OF GEOPOLITICAL INVESTORS TO INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION 
The protection of state-owned investors is central in the debate 
on the commercial nature and limits of investment arbitration.58  The 
                                                             
 56 See, e.g., Sebastien Peyrouse, Central Asia’s Tortured Chinese Love Affair, EAST 
ASIA FORUM (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/30/central-
asias-tortured-chinese-love-
affair/?utm_source=subscribe2&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=postnotify
&utm_id=53297&utm_title=Central+Asia%26rsquo%3Bs+tortured+Chinese+love
+affair [https://perma.cc/22KD-6UQS] (highlighting the effects of China’s 
increasing influence in central Asia). 
 57 Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Mongolia (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2017).  
See also Sergey Radchenko, Sino-Russian Competition in Mongolia, THE ASAN FORUM 
(Nov. 22, 2013), http://mad-intelligence.com/sino-russian-competition-in-
mongolia/ [https://perma.cc/V6GD-HNSR] (discussing the foreign investment 
competition between Russia and China in Mongolia); Leon Trakman, Geopolitics, 
China, and Investor-state Arbitration, in CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 268, 284 (Lisa Toohey et al. eds., 
2015) (examining China’s use of BITs to improve its economy and broaden its 
influence abroad). 
 58 See, e.g., Meg Lippincott, Depoliticizing Sovereign Wealth Funds Through 
International Arbitration, 13 CHI. J. INT. L. 649 (2013) (assessing the impact of 
international arbitration on the ability to monitor sovereign wealth funds); Claudia 
Annacker, Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under Investment Treaties, 
10 CHINESE J. INT. L. 531 (2011) (examining the role of the sovereign investor in 
investor-State arbitration); Skovgaard Poulsen, supra note 11 (highlighting 
increasing globalization of State capitalism and the potential need for reevaluating 
investment treaty provisions); Blyshak, supra note 9 (analyzing the status of State-
owned enterprise in the realm of foreign investment); Mark Feldman, The Standing 
of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2010–2011 (Karl Sauvant ed., 2011) (discussing the 
role of state-owned entities under international investment treaties). 
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participation of SOEs in investment arbitration presents a challenge 
to the investment law discipline relating to the role of the state as 
claimant in investor-state disputes.  The question of access of 
“geopolitical investors” to arbitration is closely related to this 
debate.  In addition to the issue of state ownership, the protection of 
geopolitical investors involves strategic (i.e., not purely commercial) 
considerations.  Do state ownership and the pursuit of non-
commercial objectives bar access to arbitration?  Alternatively, does 
investment arbitration—a mechanism created to remove the home 
state from investor-state dispute resolution—provide a forum for 
the settlement of disputes with geopolitical characteristics? 
Access to arbitration first depends on the claimant’s 
qualification as an “investor” within the meaning of the applicable 
investment treaty.  Investment treaties that expressly refer to SOEs 
in the definition of “investors” are the exception.59  However, state 
ownership and control are unlikely to be obstacles to accessing 
arbitration under investment treaties that leave open the form of 
ownership of the investors covered by the treaty (e.g., most Russian 
and Chinese bilateral investment treaties (BITs)).60 
According to the 2016 judgment of the Paris Court of Appeals in 
Ukraine v. Tatneft, treaties that do not explicitly include the 
requirement of private ownership in the definition of investors 
                                                             
 59 See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts. 
201, 1139, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (listing country-specific definitions and 
dispute-related definitions); Kazakhstan Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Kaz., 
May 19, 1992, U.S. DEPT. ST. (outlining agreed-upon BIT objectives between the 
United States and Kazakhstan); Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Kyrg., 
Jan. 19, 1993, U.S. DEPT. ST. (outlining agreed-upon BIT objectives between the 
United States and Kyrgyzstan).  See also other US BITs discussed in KENNETH 
VANDEVELDE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 122 (2009) (highlighting 
a 2004 modification to the United States’ model for its bilateral investment treaties). 
 60 See DMITRII LABIN, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO PO ZASHCHITE I 
POOSHCHRENIIU INOSTRANNYKH INVESTITSII (2008); VADIM SILKIN, PRIAMYE 
INOSTRANNYE INVESTITSII V ROSSII – PRAVOVYE FORMY PRIVLECHENIIA I ZASHCHITY 
(2003); NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
POLICIES AND PRACTICE (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2009) (analyzing the policies and 
practices around Chinese investment treaties).  Cf. Agreement Between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., Apr. 
19, 2011, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, DEPT. OF 
TREATY & LAW (outlining agreed-upon BIT objectives between the China and 
Uzbekistan). 
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cannot be limited in scope to “private investors.”61  According to the 
2017 China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia arbitral award, “the fact that the 
Chinese State directly or indirectly owns . . . China Heilongjiang has 
no relevance for the purpose of [China Heilongjiang’s] qualification 
as [an] ‘economic entit[y],’” and thus qualifies as an “investor” 
within the meaning of the China-Mongolia investment treaty.62  If 
the absence of an explicit reference to state ownership and control is 
interpreted to exclude SOEs from the scope of investment treaties, a 
very significant share of China’s and Russia’s foreign investments 
would be denied the benefit of arbitration.63 
Second, access to arbitration of geopolitical projects depends on 
their legal qualification as “investments,” and in particular whether 
the applicable treaty is limited in scope to purely commercial 
investment activities.  Most investment treaties adopt a broad 
definition of investment as “every kind of asset, owned or controlled 
by an Investor.”64  Certain investment treaties expressly refer to 
“economic activities” or “business enterprises” in the definition of 
investment.65  Arbitral tribunals have taken diverging approaches to 
                                                             
 61 See Cour d’Appel [CA]  [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Nov. 29, 2016,  
14/17964, ¶ 514 (Fr.) (confirming that the entity requesting the arbitration benefited 
from the protection of the bilateral investment treaty as it had to be considered to 
be a foreign investor and not be assimilated with the contracting state); id. at ¶ 525 
(holding that for the Court, neither the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
nor any principle of interpretation allows a distinction where the bilateral 
investment treaty does not distinguish.  Yet, the latter does not refer to any 
“private” investor.).  See also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States Preamble (Oct. 14, 1966), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6KSJ-FMPV] (referring to the “role of private international 
investment” for international economic cooperation, without limiting the scope of 
the Convention to private investors) (emphasis added). 
 62 Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd., et al. v. Mongolia, supra note 57, at 
¶ 417. 
 63 See Annacker, supra note 58, at 539–40 (discussing investment treaties that 
fail to expressly protect SOEs investing abroad). 
 64 JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 195 (Sir Frank Berman 
KCMG QC ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
 65 See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty art. 1, ¶ 6, Dec. 17, 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 380) 24; 
Agreement Between the Czech Republic and the United Mexican States on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Czech-Mex., art. 1, Mar. 13, 
2004; Agreement Between the Lebanese Republic and the Republic of Iceland on 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Leb-Ice., art. 1, June 24, 
2004; Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic 
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the interpretation of “investment” when investment activities are 
linked to the home state’s foreign policy. 
On the one hand, some arbitral tribunals have been reluctant to 
engage in an assessment of the motivation underlying foreign 
investments.  According to the 2006 arbitral decision in Saluka v. 
Czech Republic, “[e]ven if it were possible to know an investor’s true 
motivation in making its investment, nothing . . . makes the 
investor’s motivation part of the definition of an ‘investment.’”66  In 
the 2003 CSOB v. Slovakia award, the tribunal ruled that “in 
determining whether [the state-owned entity], in discharging these 
functions, exercised governmental functions, the focus must be on 
the nature of these activities and not their purpose.”67  The claimant 
in this case was found to act on behalf of the state and to promote 
governmental policies and purposes.  Nevertheless, the tribunal 
found that the activities themselves (i.e., banking) were essentially 
economic rather than governmental in nature, and, on this basis, the 
tribunal accepted jurisdiction.68 
On the other hand, in China Heilongjiang v. Mongolia, the arbitral 
tribunal readily examined whether the claimants acted as “quasi-
instrumentalities of the Chinese government.”69  In particular, the 
                                                             
of Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
China-Ger., art. 1, Nov. 11, 2005. 
 66 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, 18 World Trade & Arbitration 
Materials 169 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006); see also Annacker, supra note 58, at 543–44 
(arguing, in the same vein, that investment treaties do not “exclude investments 
because the assets invested are . . . invested in furtherance of State policies or 
purposes”). 
 67 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 20 (May 24, 1999).  See also CDC Group 
PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award, ¶ 17 (Dec. 
17, 2003) (acknowledging that the “CDC’s activities are commercial in substance 
and nature.”).  It must be noted that both decisions were made on the basis of the 
ICSID Convention that, according to the so-called “Broches test” does not extend 
arbitration to foreign investors that are “acting as an agent for the government or 
[are] discharging an essentially governmental function.”  Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
supra note 61. 
 68 For criticism of these decisions, see FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 24 (critiquing 
the decisions in the cases involving CSOB and CDC Group, respectively); BLYSHAK, 
supra note 9, at 30–32 (arguing against unconditional acceptance of the “nature” test 
applied in CSOB). 
 69 Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd., et al. v. Mongolia, supra note 57, at 
¶ 418. 
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tribunal assessed whether the Chinese state-owned enterprises 
acted under the Chinese government’s “express instruction to invest 
abroad in order to serve China’s foreign policy goals,” and 
concluded that they did not.70  Similarly, in the 2017 Beijing Urban 
Construction Group v. Yemen award, the tribunal assessed whether 
the Chinese state-owned enterprise functioned as an agent of the 
state.71  In that case, the tribunal focused on the functions of the 
enterprise “in the particular instance” of its investment activity, and 
again ruled that the SOE did not make the investment concerned as 
a state agent.72 
By focusing on the commercial nature (as opposed to the 
purpose) of investments, the former interpretative approach 
(endorsed by the Saluka and CSOB tribunals) opens arbitration to 
investors that pursue foreign policy objectives.  Geopolitical 
investments—as part of a State’s infrastructure diplomacy—are 
generally economic in nature.  In the energy sector, for instance, they 
are made in connection with the economic activities of energy 
production, transportation, or supply.  Moreover, these investments 
are generally long-term, involve operational risks, and contribute to 
the economic development of the host state.73  The same conclusion 
applies to strategic investments that have limited prospects of future 
profitability (e.g., Russian investments in power plants in Central 
Asia).  Some investment treaties include the “expectation of gain or 
profit” in the definition of investment.74  Even in this case, 
international investment law does not condition access to arbitration 
to a market-economy test or a rational-investor test.75  As 
                                                             
 70 Id. 
 71 Beijing Urban Construction Group v. Yemen, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/30, ¶ 42 (May 31, 2017). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom of Morocco, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001) (discussing 
“the criteria to be used for the definition of an investment pursuant to the 
convention.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art.1, Nov. 1, 2006.  See generally, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.p
df. 
 75 In contrast, at the pre-establishment stage, governments (e.g., in the USA 
and Australia) look at the motivation of the prospective investors.  The Australian 
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highlighted by the Allard v. Barbados case, tribunals can accept that 
“expectations of an eventual profit were honestly held by [the 
investor] . . . notwithstanding that . . . factors of profit were 
considered secondary and in the background to his principal 
motivations of . . . public purposes.”76 
However, following the latter purpose-based interpretative 
approach (endorsed by the China Heilongjiang and Beijing Urban 
Construction Group tribunals), an arbitral tribunal can in principle 
refuse jurisdiction if there is evidence that the foreign investment 
was made in the pursuit of the home state’s strategic interest, based 
on express instructions by the home state government.  According 
to geopolitical theory and as highlighted by Russia’s energy 
investments in Central Asia, geopolitical investments can be made 
on the basis of express government orders to realize these projects 
as part of the country’s foreign policy (infrastructure diplomacy).77  
However, finding conclusive evidence of the strategic rationale of 
an investment is a most delicate task.78  As examined above, the 
                                                             
Government considers “if the investment is commercial in nature or if the investor 
may be pursuing broader political or strategic objectives that may be contrary to 
Australia’s national interest.”  Treasury of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 10 (2016), 
https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAV5-GND5].  The Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the USA examines whether investments have been “based solely on 
commercial grounds”, taking into account the degree of disclosure by the investor 
of the objectives of its investments.  Guidance Concerning the National Security 
Review Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
73 Fed. Reg 74,567, 74,571 (Dec. 8, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUSGuidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WER5-6T5A]. 
 76 Allard v. Barbados, Decision on Jurisdiction, PCA Case Repository No. 
2012-06, ¶ 51 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014). 
 77 See, e.g., Pastanavlenie Pravitel’stva RF July 30, 2009 No. 1063-r ‘O podpisanii 
Soglasheniia mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Respubliki 
Tadzhikistan o Sotrudnichestve po Ekspluatatsii Sangtudinskoi GES-1’, SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA RF 4055 (Aug. 10, 2009); Pastanavlenie Pravitel’stva RF Apr.6 
2013 No. 299 ‘O vnesenii na ratifikatsiiu Soglasheniia mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Kirgizskoi Respubliki o Stroitel’stve i Ekspluatatsii 
Kambaratinskoi GES-1, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA RF 1805 (Apr. 15, 2013). 
 78 For instance, concomitance between the making of a certain foreign 
investment and certain geopolitical developments could serve as evidence of the 
geopolitical purpose of a foreign investment.  See, e.g., Caratube International Oil 
Company LLP v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, Award, ¶ 936 (Sept. 
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objectives of geopolitical investments are often masked and mixed 
with commercial considerations.79  With “hybrid companies 
masquerading as commercial actors, but actually controlled by 
states and acting with strategic consequences,”80 the geopolitical 
purpose of investments is difficult to determine based on objective 
factors. 
In conclusion, a host state government’s perception that a certain 
investment poses a risk to national security is difficult to integrate 
into the tribunal’s analysis on jurisdiction.  Rejecting the purpose-
based approach to the assessment of investments is both logical and 
practical.  By focusing on the economic nature of investments, 
arbitration tribunals avoid the delicate task of discovering the real 
motivation underlying foreign investments in strategic sectors.81  On 
this basis, investment arbitration can provide the forum for the 
resolution of disputes that indirectly involve the home state as 
claimant and that concern heavily politicized issues of potential high 
strategic importance for both states involved.82  However, as will be 
seen in the following section, geopolitical arguments relating to 
governments’ perceptions of risk are relevant for the application of 
substantive standards of protection. 
4.  MERITS: STATES’ RIGHT TO REGULATE GEOPOLITICAL RISK 
The debate in the investment law literature on the sovereign 
right to regulate has, to a large extent, centered on the internalization 
of environmental externalities.83  A closely related question is 
                                                             
27, 2017) (ruling that “the chronology of the facts taken as a whole” can provide 
evidence of the “real motivation” behind parties’ actions). 
 79 See Section II.A, infra. 
 80 Clinton, supra note 37. 
 81 Blyshak, supra note 9, at 29; Ji Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current 
Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 380, 401 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco eds., 2015). 
 82 For criticism, see Blyshak, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing potential 
complications with investment arbitration involving a “government agent”); 
Feldman, supra note 58 (discussing issues of standing for SOEs under the ICSID). 
 83 See, e.g., KYLA TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
(2009) (discussing the relationship between investment protection and 
environmental protection); JORGE VIÑUALES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/2
2019] Economic Statecraft 405 
whether, in the context of increasing concerns regarding the role of 
SOEs as geopolitical actors, investment arbitration recognizes the 
host states’ right to internalize the security externalities of existing 
investments in strategic assets (e.g., new operational restrictions, 
mandatory partnership with a national investor, and even forced 
disinvestment).  Can the host states’ perception of geopolitical risk 
justify security measures under investment arbitration—a 
mechanism that aims to depoliticize investor-state disputes on the 
basis of “objective enquiry”84 and “objective legal criteria”?85 
4.1.  Non-discrimination of Non-allied Foreign SOEs and Due Process 
The admission of foreign investments in strategic sectors 
following a national security review does not on its own constitute 
a commitment by the state to refrain from adopting more stringent 
security requirements in the future.86  In some cases, national law 
can even explicitly foresee the possibility to reopen security reviews 
                                                             
ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015) (analyzing the major challenges facing 
States and foreign investors as a result of the friction between investment law and 
environmental law); see generally AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2014) (discussing States’ and regional 
organisations’ right to regulate under specific public policy objectives to safeguard 
their regulatory power and delimit tribunals’ interpretive power); CAROLINE 
HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: 
BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND REGULATORY AUTONOMY (2015) 
(examining how investment tribunals have balanced the competing interests of host 
states and foreign investors in determining state liability in disputes concerning the 
exercise of public power). 
 84 Allard v. Barbados, supra note 76, at ¶ 46; Peter Allard v. Barbados, PCA 
Case No. 2012-06, Award, ¶ 84 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
 85 See Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 
345, 347 (August Reinisch & Ursula Kriebaum eds., 2007) (discussing the balancing 
of interests of the parties concerned in arbitration); CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID 
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 416 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing advantages to each 
party in arbitration). 
 86 See, e.g., Total S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case 
ARB/04/1, ¶ 312 (Dec. 27, 2010); El Paso Energy International Company v. 
Argentina, Award, ICSID Case ARB/03/15, ¶ 374 (Oct. 31, 2011); Charanne B.V. 
Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v. Spain, Award, SCC ARB 062/2012, ¶ 490 (Jan. 
21, 2016) (considering the importance of stabilization commitments for the 
protection of investors’ expectations under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard). 
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for existing investments and adopt additional security requirements 
if this is necessary to address new security risks.87  The dynamic 
nature of geopolitics can help justify the need for regulatory changes 
to the certification of an existing investment.  Changes in alliances 
and the deterioration of relations between the host state and the 
home state affect the host state’s perception of security risk of 
investments by SOEs, thus requiring regulatory intervention in 
cases of foreign control over strategic assets.88 
A key challenge to the justification of new security requirements 
is that measures taken in the context of geopolitical tensions target 
SOEs from non-allied states and treat them differently from 
investors from allied states and national investors.89  These measures 
are often “directed specifically against a certain investor by reason 
of his, her or its nationality,” and thus raise questions of 
compatibility with the investment protection standards of national 
treatment, most favored nation, expropriation, and fair and 
equitable treatment.90 
In the EU energy sector, for instance, Russian investments are 
seen with increasing suspicion in the context of deteriorating EU-
                                                             
 87 For instance, the “Gazprom clause” recognizes the “right of Member States 
to exercise . . . national legal controls to protect legitimate public security interests” 
and establishes the right of the EU Commission to request national authorities to 
re-open a certification procedure.  Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Natural Gas Art. 11, July 13, 2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, O.J. L211/94. 
 88 See Section II.B, infra. 
 89 Nationality-based difference in treatment also affects security reviews at the 
pre-establishment stage.  In Australia, for instance, the Foreign Investment Review 
Board in 2016 rejected a bid by the Chinese state-owned company State Grid for the 
network company Ausgrid on the basis of security concerns in the absence of a 
partnership with a local investor, while North American bidders were allegedly 
told that they would not be bound by the same security requirements.  See Jamie 
Freed, Australia Courts U.S., Canada After Rejecting Chinese Bids for Ausgrid, REUTERS 
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-privatisation-
ausgrid-idUSKCN11K07E [https://perma.cc/QH4J-7SLC]. 
 90 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case ARB/01/11,  Award,  ¶ 180 
(Oct. 12, 2005).  See also RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 200–01 (2012) (discussing various considerations 
in defining differentiation); Andrea Bjorklund, National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 29, 37 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) (claiming that NAFTA 
Chapter 11 awards are leading jurisprudence in the area of national treatment 
disputes, but that tribunals are nevertheless not uniform in how they decide 
national treatment cases). 
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Russian relations.91  According to the 2014 Energy Security Strategy, 
the EU aims to reduce its dependency on Russian gas, which 
currently amounts to more than one third of EU natural gas 
imports.92  However, Norwegian gas imports and energy 
investments are not a cause of concern, despite the fact that 
Norwegian gas amounts to more than 30 percent of EU imports.93  
Although de jure EU law remains neutral on the energy security 
requirements of non-EU companies, there are clear risks of de facto 
discrimination in the application of the Gazprom Clause, and EU 
energy and competition law more generally.94  In the US, a Chinese 
investor in wind energy production was forced in 2012 to divest its 
investment in a wind energy farm based on security concerns 
relating to its location in proximity of a military basis, while other 
foreign energy investors in the same zone could allegedly continue 
to operate their installations.95 
Geopolitical analysis can help host states demonstrate that 
foreign investors that are perceived to present a security risk are not 
“in like circumstances” with domestic or other foreign investors in 
the same sector or business because of the different geopolitical 
circumstances that characterize these investments.96  By analyzing 
the strategic use (infrastructure diplomacy) that certain states make 
of foreign investments in strategic assets,97 the economic statecraft 
and geopolitical theories explain how investments by the SOE of a 
                                                             
 91 See Section II.B, infra. 
 92 European Commission, supra note 48, at 1. 
 93 EUROSTAT, EU Imports of Energy Products - Recent Developments (October 
2018), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products_-
_recent_developments#Main_suppliers_of_natural_gas_and_petroleum_oils_to_t
he_EU [https://perma.cc/2VUB-V5X5]. 
 94 See Section II.B, infra.  See also Cottier, et al., supra note 51, at 12 (discussing 
the treatment of foreign service suppliers under the Gazprom Clause); Goldthau, 
supra note 13, at 14 (discussing problems associated with unequal bargaining power 
in gas pipeline infrastructure). 
 95 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 96 Arbitral practice generally accepts that “only foreign and domestic 
investments that raise similar public policy concerns should be compared.”  
Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment 
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT. L. 48, 72 (2008). 
 97 See Section II.A, infra. 
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non-allied state can be a “legitimate concern” for the host state.98  
Moreover, the theory on the dynamic nature of geopolitics99 helps 
explain how, following the deterioration of bilateral relations 
between the host and home states, mitigating the security risks 
associated with a strategic investment can be “a legitimate public 
policy objective.”100 
According to the economic statecraft and geopolitical theories, it 
is a government’s perception of risk – and not necessarily a fully 
rational and objective assessment of the geopolitical reality – that 
can drive host state to intervene with investments of a specific SOE 
in a strategic asset.101  Despite the objectivity of the arbitration 
process, investment tribunals generally accept that a host state’s 
perceived need of a certain policy can provide a legitimate reason 
for regulatory intervention with investments.102  “Some measure of 
inefficiency, a degree of trial and error, [and] a modicum of human 
imperfection” are permissible.103 
In the context of geopolitical tensions between the home and the 
host state, the risk of arbitrary interference with investments from 
                                                             
 98 See, e.g., Genin v. Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 362, 370 (June 
25, 2001) (discussing the importance of “legitimate concerns” and “legitimate public 
purpose” for the assessment of state measures under the non-discrimination and 
fair and equitable treatment standards).  See also Kenneth Vandevelde, A Unified 
Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 43, 54 (2010) 
(explaining that reasonableness, one of the principles in determining fair and 
equitable treatment standards, requires the conduct to be reasonably related to a 
legitimate public policy objective). 
 99 See Section II.B, infra. 
 100 Vandevelde, A Unified Theory, supra note 98, at 54.  See also Archer Daniels 
Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/(AF)/04/5, Award, ¶¶ 110–84 (Nov. 21, 2007); Corn Products Int’l, Inc. 
v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, ¶¶ 144–91 
(Jan. 15, 2008) (both discussed in Paparinskis, supra note 11, at 271 as examples of 
how “the broader controversies between the home and host States can be brought 
back into the arbitral process.”). 
 101 See Section II.B, infra. 
 102 See, e.g., GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mex., UNCITRAL, ¶ 114 (Nov. 15, 2004) 
(finding that Mexico’s perceived legitimate goal in favor of public policy, though 
misguided, was not discriminatory); see also Martins Paparinskis, Good Faith and Fair 
and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, in GOOD FAITH AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 143 (Andrew D. Mitchell et al. eds., 2015) 
(discussing the role of good faith in international investments). 
 103 See Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech, SCC Case No.088/2004, Partial Award, ¶ 
272 (Mar. 27, 2007) (holding that “some measure of inefficiency, a degree of trial 
and error, [and] a modicum of human imperfection” are permissible). 
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the home state is considerable.  This risk is particularly acute for 
SOEs because of their close link with, and thus perceived influence 
on, the home state’s government.  In principle, international 
investment law protects foreign investors against politically 
motivated measures.104  In Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt, a 
2017 decision concerning state interference with a gas pipeline 
investment in the context of geopolitical tensions between the 
importing state (Israel) and the exporting state (Egypt), the tribunal 
accepted to take into account the geopolitical context of the 
dispute.105  The tribunal ruled on this basis that the termination of 
the natural gas export agreement (the economic foundation of the 
investment) constituted a disproportionate act and thus an unlawful 
expropriation because Egypt “terminated the GSPA [export 
agreement] at a time when many in Egypt voiced strong opposition 
to the supply of gas to Israel.”106 
Similarly, according to Cargill v. Mexico, “a measure . . . designed 
to put pressure on the [home state’s government] will focus on those 
who are likely to be able to influence the [home state’s] government 
and, in this, there is no necessary relationship with economic 
circumstances. In other words, ( . . . ) there is no link here between 
the alleged difference-a difference in economic circumstances-and 
the rationale and objective of the measure in question.”107  
According to Waste Management v. Mexico, there can be no doubt that 
“a deliberate conspiracy” against the foreign investment would 
constitute a breach of a basic obligation of treatment.108  According 
to Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, a “deliberate campaign to punish [a 
                                                             
 104 See, e.g., Eureko B.V. v. Pol., UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award, ¶ 46 (Aug. 
19, 2005) (noting that the State Treasury Minister admitted his attempt to void an 
investment agreement was politically motivated; Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 375, 378, 426 (July 14, 2006) (finding that “politicization 
. . . is an element in the . . . determination that the fair and equitable standard has 
been breached”); Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 
¶¶ 500, 698 (July 18, 2008) (finding political motives behind termination of a 
contract “were inconsistent with the Republic’s obligations”). 
 105 Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Egypt, ICSID Case ARB/12/11, Decision 
on Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶ 344 (Feb. 21, 2017). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Cargill, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶¶ 209, 220 
(Sept. 18, 2009). 
 108 Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 
138 (Apr. 30, 2004). 
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foreign investor for political reasons] must surely be the clearest 
infringement one could find of the provisions and aims of the 
Treaty.”109 
Invoking the policy objective of mitigating the security risks 
associated with strategic investments is thus not enough to justify 
all measures taken by a state in the name of this policy.110  The 
security measure must be “taken because of”111 the perceived security 
risks characterizing the strategic investment, and not to achieve an 
abstract objective,112 such as retaliating against the SOE to punish or 
seek to influence the home state’s government. 
By de-codifying the strategic behavior of states, geopolitical 
analysis can help distinguish between reasonable and arbitrary 
interference with strategic investments.  On the one hand, 
geopolitical analysis highlights that, in the context of interstate 
tensions, the host state can have genuine concerns that the SOE from 
a non-allied state can make use of its control over a strategic asset, 
such as energy, to undermine the host state’s national security (e.g., 
by interrupting energy supply).113  On this basis, regulatory 
                                                             
 109 Dissenting Opinion of Daniel M. Price, in Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/18, Award (July 26, 2007), citing Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 123. 
 110 AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 
10.3.9 (Sept. 23, 2010).  See also Jürgen Kurtz, Balancing Investor Protection and 
Regulatory Freedom in International Investment Law: The Necessary, Complex and Vital 
Search for State Purpose, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 
2013-2014 251, 279 (Andrea Bjorklund ed., 2015) (arguing that the tribunal in GAMI 
v. Mexico failed to draw a distinction between Mexico’s general policy goals and the 
specific “exercise of discretion when implementing that goal”). 
 111 Cargill, supra note 107, at ¶ 204. 
 112 Vandevelde, supra note 98, at 97; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. 
v. Mexico, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 163 (May 29, 2003). 
 113 For instance, the WTO Panel in European Union and its Member States – 
Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector (WT/DS476/R), 10 August 2018, ¶ 
7.1202, ruled that “foreign control of TSOs [Transmission System Operators] poses 
a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of the EU society, 
namely its security of energy supply.”  The Panel came to this conclusion by 
accepting the argument that “there is a real and true possibility, rather than a 
merely hypothetical one, of foreign governments requiring or inducing foreign 
controlled TSOs to undermine the European Union’s security of energy supply” (¶ 
7.1194) and considering that “[s]ince natural gas is transported by TSOs through 
infrastructure, which is fixed and, at any given time, of finite quantity, it can 
reasonably be inferred that there will be a significant impact on the supply of 
natural gas, and hence energy, if a foreign government requires or induces even a 
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interference with the SOE’s investment can be justified by the host 
state’s perception that the specific security risk linked to a strategic 
asset can materialize following the deterioration of bilateral 
relations with a previously allied home state.  On the other hand, 
geopolitical analysis highlights how, in the context of interstate 
disputes, the host state can be tempted to interfere with SOEs to 
influence or retaliate against the home state.  By protecting foreign 
investments against regulatory measures that are motivated by 
political considerations, investment arbitration provides a forum for 
the depoliticization of investment disputes.  Such a forum avoids 
SOEs from becoming the victims of geopolitical tensions between 
the home and host states. 
The transparency of the host state’s relation with the foreign 
investor can be a decisive factor in determining whether the host 
state acted in good faith and with respect of due process.114  In cases 
concerning the security risks of geopolitical investments, the issue 
of transparency is delicate because of the sensitivity of the 
information related to national security.  However, there is no 
reason why investors in strategic assets would not have the right to 
benefit from basic procedural protections such as the right to be 
informed of the security action against its investment, to be given 
access to unclassified evidence on which the government relied to 
make its decision on the need for additional security measures, and 
to be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.115  According 
to Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, the failure of the host state to 
disclose the rationale underlying a discriminatory measure can 
                                                             
single or a few TSOs to violate their obligations under EU law or to act contrary to 
their commercial interests” (¶ 7.1199). 
 114 Tecmed, supra note 112, at ¶ 154.  See generally Maffezini v. Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 83 (Nov. 13, 2000); MTD Equity v. 
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 163 (May 25, 2004); 
Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, 
Award, ¶ 164 (Oct. 27, 2006); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 84 (Feb. 6, 2007); PSEG Global, Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶ 173–74 (Jan. 19, 2007) (discussing the 
principle of transparency under international investment law).  But see United 
Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, BCSC 664, ¶¶ 68-70 (2001) (explaining the 
insignificance of transparency problems in determining a certain international 
investment issue). 
 115 Ralls Corporation v. CFIUS, supra note 95. 
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amount to a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard.116  
Moreover, arbitral tribunals can assess the extent to which the host 
state informed the investor of the preconditions for an acceptable 
solution to the perceived risk,117 such as entering into a partnership 
with an investor from the host state or an allied State.118 
Given the stress on objectivity that is supposed to govern the 
arbitration process, the relevance of the host state’s perception of 
risk to justify interference with investors is not self-evident.  
Depending on the measure of deference that arbitral tribunals 
provide to states, the application of objective legal criteria to the 
assessment of security measures can impose important limitations 
on the implementation of security policies.  For instance, in AAPL v. 
Sri Lanka,119 the tribunal examined the destruction by government 
forces of an investment, a farm, that was allegedly used as an 
operational center for separatist activities during the Tamil 
insurgency against the government.120  Applying an objective 
standard of vigilance of the state,121 the majority of the tribunal ruled 
that the government should have tried peaceful communication 
before undertaking military action against the investment.122  The 
majority’s decision generated criticism for second-guessing the 
                                                             
 116 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, supra note 66, at ¶ 407.  See also 
MTD Equity, supra note 114, at ¶ 163 (highlighting the inconsistency between two 
arms of government in implementing the legal framework to regulate the foreign 
investment); Siemens, supra note 114, at ¶ 84; Tecmed, supra note 112, at ¶ 215 
(discussing the disclosure by states of crucial information on the regulation of a 
foreign investment). 
 117 Saluka, supra note 66, at ¶¶ 420–25. 
 118 See e.g., Andrew Ward & Jim Pickard, Hinkley Go-ahead after ‘National 
Security’ Safeguards, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/0cde26b6-7b66-11e6-b837-eb4b4333ee43 
[https://perma.cc/3HPY-KVJT] (detailing Theresa May’s approval of the Hinkley 
Deal and the new conditions and requirements accompanying the approval); 
Francois De Beaupuy, U.K. Approves EDF’s £18 Billion Hinkley Point Nuclear Project, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
09-14/u-k-said-to-approve-edf-s-18-billion-pound-nuclear-project-it39ityn 
[https://perma.cc/SN7X-ZTFS] (detailing the approval of Hinkley Point C and 
Chinese involvement in the plan). 
 119 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, Award, ICSID Case 
ARB/87/3 (June 27, 1990). 
 120 See Stephen Vasciannie, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Civil Strife: The 
AAPL/Sri Lanka Arbitration, 34 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 332, 334 (1992). 
 121 AAPL, supra note 119, at ¶ 77. 
 122 Id. at ¶ 84. 
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modalities and timing of a “strategic and highly sensitive security 
operation to regain its sovereign control of the area of 
insurgency.”123 By refusing to recognize that the government was 
under a compelling sovereign duty to undertake action and by 
rejecting its strategic decisions, the majority can be criticized for 
unduly interfering with the exercise by the state of its sovereign 
powers.124  Indeed, in determining whether a certain state of affairs 
engages national security concerns, tribunals have good reasons to 
“afford a measure of deference to states, principally on the basis that 
states are best placed to determine whether the situation in their 
territory engages these concerns.”125  
In principle, the sovereign right of states to regulate and protect 
critical infrastructure against security threats from foreign actors 
must be respected.  Provided that the host state can demonstrate 
how investors of a certain origin can use control over a certain asset 
to harm national security, such as interrupt energy supply, a certain 
level of deference is due in the assessment of security measures.  
Geopolitical analysis can provide a strong rationale for state 
intervention by helping the host state to substantiate its perception 
of risk relating to foreign ownership over a particular asset and the 
home state’s potential strategic ambitions with that asset. 
                                                             
 123 Samuel Asante, Dissenting Opinion in AAPL, supra note 119. 
 124 See Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in STANDARDS OF 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131, 140 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) (suggesting that the 
majority in AAPL applied the “due diligence” criterion in a controversial way); 
Vasciannie, supra note 120, at 353. 
 125 Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The 
Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State 
Arbitration, 4 J. INT. DISP. SETTLEMENT 197, 207 (2013) (arguing that appropriately 
deferential approach to the standard of review from investment tribunals would 
achieve a more balanced relationship between the protection of foreign investment 
and the host state); see also Freya Baetens, Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality: 
Determining Likeness in Human Rights and Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 279, 313 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010) 
(suggesting that serious security concerns could justify discriminatory measures 
even when there was an intent to discriminate against the particular investor based 
on its nationality); GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN 
CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 89 (2013) 
(reviewing arbitral decisions and finding that there are very few indicators of 
restraint “based on the relative capacity of governments”). 
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4.2.  The “Essential Security Interest” Exception 
In a case where an arbitral tribunal refuses to recognize the 
government’s right to regulate geopolitical risk, a state can invoke 
the “essential interest” clause, if applicable under the relevant BIT.  
These clauses authorize states to derogate from their investment 
protection obligations if it is necessary to protect their essential 
interests.126  To qualify as an essential interest under international 
law, the risk that foreign investments represent for national security 
must meet the threshold set by investment tribunals.127 
Arbitral Tribunals accept that economic emergencies, and not 
just military security, can qualify as an essential security interest of 
the state.128  In LG&E v. Argentina, the Tribunal highlighted that 
economic problems can constitute an essential security interest, 
because “When a State’s economic foundation is under siege, the 
severity of the problem can equal that of any military invasion.”129 
According to economic statecraft and geopolitical theories, the use 
of investments for strategic purposes is sometimes a preferred 
means of geopolitical combat to the exercise of military power.130  
Following the LG&E decision, the security implications of 
geopolitical investments can represent essential security interests, in 
case the risk for the economy is sufficiently severe, for example a 
blackout of the electricity system.  The host state will have to 
                                                             
 126 See William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INTL. L. 307, 349-354 (2008) 
(describing NPM clauses that allow states to take actions otherwise inconsistent 
with the treaty in certain situations, for example, the actions that are necessary for 
the protection of essential security); see also Caterine Gibson, Beyond Self-Judgement: 
Exceptions Clauses in US BITs, 38 FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 1 (2015) (analyzing and 
suggesting exceptions clauses in the BIT for US negotiators). 
 127 UNCTAD, supra note 6, 72–102. 
 128 Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case 
ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 175 (Sept. 5, 2008); see also William J. Moon, Essential Security 
Interests in International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INTL. ECON. L. 481, 500 (2012) 
(arguing that essential security interests are not triggered unless a host state’s 
national security interests are at stake.). 
 129 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case ARB/02/1, Decision on 
Liability, ¶ 238 (Oct. 3, 2006). 
 130 BLACKWILL & HARRIS, supra note 4, at 1–18; see also BALDWIN, supra note 1, 
at 9 (discussing the implications of the rise in using geoeconomic policies in 
addition or in place of traditional military power). 
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demonstrate how the SOE from a non-allied country can use its 
control over a strategic asset to threaten public security. 
Threats to national security and the necessity to act to avoid 
these threats must be established on the basis of objective criteria, 
leaving little room for “measures of discretion,”131 unless the treaty 
explicitly recognizes the right of the state to apply measures that are 
non-compliant with the treaty in cases where compliance would be 
harmful to the State’s essential interests.132  By allowing for “the 
subjective evaluation of the State claiming the derogation,”133 the so-
called “self-judging” clauses provide a strong basis for the 
recognition of the states’ perception of security risk relating to the 
control of strategic assets by certain investors.  The role of arbitral 
tribunals is limited to a good faith review of the contested state 
measure, in particular of whether there is a rational basis for the 
state’s invocation of the applicable essential security clause.134  
Geopolitical analysis can help states to substantiate their concerns 
regarding the control by certain states over strategic assets and 
justify the connection between this perceived threat to national 
security and the measures taken. 
                                                             
 131 Oil Platform (Iran v U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 73 (November 2003).  
See also Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International 
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INTL. L. 907, 926 (2006) ( . . . “some international courts provide states 
with wider margins of discretion in security-related  matters”); Lisa Bohmer, 
Another Indian BIT Award Surfaces, Revealing Divergence between A Pair of Tribunals 
with Respect to Application of “Essential Security” Clauses, Investment Arbitration 
Reporter, Sept. 17, 2018, https://www.iareporter.com/articles/another-indian-bit-
award-surfaces-revealing-divergence-between-a-pair-of-tribunals-with-respect-to-
application-of-essential-security-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/6TNR-UF6W] 
(reporting on the Deutsche Telekom AG (DT) v. India BIT dispute).  But see the 
majority in CC/Devas Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Telcom 
Devas Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016, ¶¶ 244–45 (“The Tribunal has also no difficulty in recognizing 
the ‘wide measure of deference . . . ‘.  National security issues relate to the existential 
core of a State.  An investor who wishes to challenge a State decision in that respect 
faces a heavy burden of proof, such as bad faith, absence of authority or application 
to measures that do not relate to essential security interests.”) 
 132 Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, If the State Considers: Self-Judging Clauses in 
International Dispute Settlement, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 61, 63 (2009). 
 133 Id. at 68. 
 134 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 126, at 379. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
The economic statecraft and geopolitical theories uncover 
dimensions to investment making and protection that are most 
relevant to investment law, but which cannot be fully understood 
solely on a legal analysis of the investments.  Certain states make use 
of foreign investments to achieve geopolitical objectives (e.g., 
control over resources and exercise of influence in regions of 
strategic importance) – a practice that is most developed in the 
energy sector. 
The geopolitical dimension of investments in strategic assets 
raises security concerns for host states.  So far, the investment law 
literature has mostly focused on the role that national security 
reviews play at the pre-establishment stage to address the threat that 
foreign investments can represent for national interests.  The 
economic statecraft and geopolitical theories highlight that threats 
to national security can occur after investments have been approved 
and implemented.  Although the geopolitical reality, such as the 
strategic importance of resources and regions, is characterized by 
relative stability, the states’ perception of risk and subsequent 
strategic reaction can undergo rapid changes.  As highlighted in the 
context of the deterioration of EU-Russian relationship, the control 
of strategic assets by an SOE holding the nationality of a country that 
is perceived as hostile can be seen as an unacceptable risk to national 
security that requires regulatory intervention.  At the same time, 
geopolitical tensions between the host and home states can expose 
SOEs to politically motivated measures designed to punish or 
influence the home state’s government. 
Despite the objective to “remove investment disputes from the 
intergovernmental political sphere,”135 investment arbitration, with 
the help of geopolitical analysis, can discipline the regulatory 
responses to the perceived security risks of strategic investments.  
Following existing arbitral practice, SOEs are likely to benefit from 
access to investment arbitration, including such cases where the 
geopolitical dimension of their investments is obvious.  The focus of 
the tribunals on the commercial nature, rather than on the purpose, 
of the investment activity to accept jurisdiction opens the door to the 
arbitration of geopolitical and thus state-to-state disputes.  
                                                             
 135 Aron Broches, Settlement of Investment Disputes, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD 
BANK, ICSID AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 161, 
163 (Aron Broches ed. 1995). 
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However, the alternative of blocking access to arbitration based on 
geopolitical considerations is unrealistic because it involves second-
guessing the motivation of investors in projects that often involve a 
complex mix of commercial and strategic objectives. 
Economic statecraft and geopolitical theories are of limited 
relevance for the host states’ defense on jurisdiction, but they can 
provide support to justify regulatory interference with strategic 
investments under the substantive standards of protection.  From 
the host state’s perspective, geopolitical arguments can be used as 
objective indicators to justify regulatory intervention with investors 
of a certain origin, and not with others.  Moreover, the theory of 
geopolitical change helps to explain how the deterioration of 
interstate relations and changes to strategic alliances create new 
security risks that, in certain circumstances, can require interfering 
with the investors’ expectations of regulatory stability.  These 
objective legal arguments are particularly important for states that 
are bound by investment treaties that do not contain a self-judging 
essential security exception clause.  The fact that security interests 
are concerned supports a higher level of deference for the national 
policy-maker.136  Assessing the availability of alternative, and less 
harmful, security measures can impose an excessively high degree 
of scrutiny on the exercise by the host state of its sovereign 
regulatory powers. 
From the perspective of investors, economic statecraft and 
geopolitical theories contribute to disciplining state interference by 
rationalizing the criteria on the basis of which security risks and 
state measures can be evaluated.  A certain degree of subjectivity in 
the definition of a country’s national interests, and its foreign policy 
actions, is unavoidable.  External policy measures, to a large extent, 
depend on the states’ perception of the geopolitical reality.  
However, if security arguments remain subjective, states could be 
“free to propose whatever explanation one deems fit”137 to justify a 
strategic reorientation of their geopolitical objectives, such as its 
external energy relations and, on this basis, to interfere with existing 
foreign investments in strategic assets.  Subjective arguments 
relating to the perceived threat that specific foreign investments 
pose to a country’s national security interests potentially open the 
door to a very broad basis for state interference with these 
investments.  The use of geopolitical analysis under investment 
                                                             
 136 See generally Henckels, supra note 125. 
 137 Guzzini, supra note 14, at 39. 
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arbitration, for example on the security risks associated to national 
dependence on certain exporters, the competition for resources, the 
strategic use by states of investments by SOEs and the consequences 
of geopolitical change, provide more objective indicators to 
substantiate the risk that investments represent, or are perceived to 
represent, for national security. 
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